Block IIF: Follow-on, or Failure?

Block IIF: Follow-on, or Failure?
http://sidt.gpsworld.com/gpssidt/content/printContentPopup.jsp?id=3D60=
0165

System Design & Test newsletter, May 2009

May 27, 2009

A few short weeks ago, the U.S. GPS program had its posterior firmly plan=
ted in the=20
catbird seat. Government spokespeople in international fora looked on ben=
ignly as=20
European, Chinese, and Russian GNSS programs struggled to resolve their i=
ssues and meet=20
their heady challenges. All was well with the world. A new GPS satellite =
launched, a=20
segment of radio-frequency spectrum secured for a promising new signal, a=
next-gen=20
satellite shipped to the Cape, and the next-next-gen program nearing succ=
essful=20
preliminary design review (since completed).

In the blink of an eye, the world is turning.

A progression of seemingly unrelated events began to affect GPS outlook.

While successfully broadcasting the new L5 signal, IIR-M (20) also began =
generating =E2=80=9Cout=20
of family=E2=80=9D measurements on L1 and L2 at low elevations.

The long-withheld Independent Assessment Team (IAT) report on eLoran appe=
ared, unanimously=20
recommending that =E2=80=9Cthe U.S. government complete the eLoran upgrad=
e and commit to eLoran as=20
the national backup to GPS for 20 years." While in itself this is good ne=
ws =E2=80=94 that is, if=20
you believe in backing up critical systems =E2=80=94 it does not augur we=
ll that a two-year=20
Freedom of Information Act fight had to be waged to pry the report loose =
from=20
know-nothings in the Department of Homeland Security, and that the vaunte=
d Obama=20
administration, heralded as a breath of change, had earlier come down on =
the same-old=20
same-old government side of taking Loran out.

Then, the motherlode. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) iss=
ued a report on=20
the future of GPS, characterizing the constellation as susceptible to fal=
ling below full=20
operational capability between 2010 and 2018.

It turns out that while a IIF payload did travel to Cape Canaveral on May=
7, this was=20
solely for the purpose of preliminary launch-system compatibility testing=
=2E The satellite=20
itself is not ready to operate in space, and in fact the IIF currently at=
the Cape is just=20
a placeholder. Or, to use press-release verbiage, to =E2=80=9Cserve as a =
risk-reduction pathfinder=20
for SV1 processing later this year.=E2=80=9D The real satellite, the IIF =
that may, repeat may, go=20
into orbit at the end of this year or early next year, continues in criti=
cal payload=20
testing at the contractor facility.

Here=E2=80=99s a bright spot, at long last. Brad Parkinson, the first GPS=
Program Office Director,=20
chief architect and advocate for GPS, has a plan for mitigating possible =
GPS brownouts =E2=80=94=20
the gaps in service that may occur if the constellation should fall below=
quorum.=20
Parkinson states that =E2=80=9CIt is possible that the constellation will=
be at a level of less=20
than 24 satellites. I would like to focus on the options that would help =
reduce this risk."

http://sidt.gpsworld.com/gpssidt/Latest+News/Parkinson-Prescribes-Remedy-=
for-GAO-Report-Alarm/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/599901

Parkinson cites two principal causes for the current at-risk status of GP=
S service. =E2=80=9CThe=20
first is that the generation of replacement satellites called IIF has bee=
n greatly=20
delayed. A substantial part of the reason for this is that the contract =
for IIF=20
satellites was placed during a period when DOD imposed a grand experiment=
in contracting.=20
In addition there were some changes to the satellite to modernize its d=
esign, but the=20
bottom line is the satellite has been on contract since 1996 and will not=
be launched=20
until 2010. The design is quite old, and the capability of the satellites=
does not meet=20
the latest requirements.=E2=80=9D

The second cause is protracted delays by the decision-making and budgetin=
g processes in=20
getting Block IIIA going. These issues have now been resolved, and Parkin=
son points out=20
that both reasons =E2=80=9Care now a matter of history. The current issue=
, that should concern us=20
all, is: what options should we pursue to substantially reduce the risks =
of brownout.=E2=80=9D

Parkinson makes three recommendations in his personal presentation to the=
PNT Advisory=20
Board meeting; the same presentation was also submitted as written testim=
ony to the=20
Congressional hearing following on the GAO report. Download the full Powe=
rpoint file, with=20
written details.

=E2=80=9CIn my view, there are three major options for mitigating brownou=
ts. Fortunately, these=20
options could be done together. These are:

o To reactivate the previously retired GPS satellites that are still
operating in normal GPS orbits.

o To speed up the GPS IIIA development space (expedite the milestone
approvals).

o To develop a simplified GPS IIIA based design, Spartan satellite
(IIIS) that would not include the extra payloads, and, once designed,
could be built quickly and launched into space with two satellites
on a booster. This would be done in parallel with the current program.=
=E2=80=9D

Conspicuous by Its Absence. Note that nothing going forward, in a positiv=
e sense, contains=20
any mention of Block IIF. While Parkinson does not explicitly dismiss the=
program out of=20
hand, such a verdict can with reasonable assumption be implied.

This step could not be taken lightly, of course. Nor would it accrue any =
direct economic=20
benefit to the GPS purse, the Air Force, the U.S. government, or the U.S.=
taxpayer. Under=20
the draconian terms of the IIF contract, the Air Force must pay Boeing a =
90 percent=20
cancellation fee for every single one of the full 12-satellite order, whe=
ther or not they=20
are actually produced.

Savings in everybody=E2=80=99s time and effort, as well as further, as ye=
t unseen, cash outlays to=20
keep (alternately, get) IIF on course, would be considerable, however. Th=
at is a highly=20
hypothetical envisioning, however, and most emphatically not one that is =
in any way=20
included, explicitly or implicitly, in the Brown-Out Mitigation presentat=
ion.

Dr. Parkinson does state that =E2=80=9CThere is a fourth option, which ma=
y have been offered by=20
some. This is to restart or expand the GPS IIF production line. The appar=
ent advantage of=20
this is that the GPS IIF is close to its first launch. Some might think m=
ajor advantage=20
would have been the fact that it is already designed. Weighing against th=
is advantage is=20
the fact that the design and the parts are obsolete. Virtually all the bo=
xes and=20
components would have to undergo a major redesign. Furthermore, the desig=
n is still=20
untried, and was developed during an era of flawed procurements.=E2=80=9D=


Counterpoint. Boeing says its engineers are working =E2=80=9Cvery closely=
with the Air force and=20
its team=E2=80=9D and that the company has taken =E2=80=9Caggressive step=
s to resolve the technical issues=20
on IIF with a strong emphasis on mission assurance.=E2=80=9D It maintains=
that it is on track to=20
deliver the first IIF satellite, ready for launch, later this year.

=E2=80=9CBoeing=E2=80=99s GPS IIF satellites,=E2=80=9D the press release =
continues, =E2=80=9Cwill deliver more capability=20
and improved mission performance to military and civilian users. . . . De=
sign changes were=20
required to ensure performance over the satellite design life and these h=
ave caused=20
schedule delays, but these changes are in the final phase of implementati=
on and a fully=20
integrated satellite (SV1) has already successfully completed the thermal=
-vacuum test=20
program =E2=80=94 the most stressing system level test. SV2 was shipped t=
o the Cape (Canaveral) on=20
May 6 to perform system-level compatibility tests and serve as a risk red=
uction pathfinder=20
for SV1 processing later this year.=E2=80=9D

The Department of Defense also made a presentation to the May 14=E2=80=93=
15 National Space-Based=20
PNT Advisory Board meeting, and in it highlighted three risks: delay of I=
IF, delay of the=20
ground control segment (OCX) contract award, and delay of GPS IIIA.

Some in the GNSS community feel that the GAO-generated furor focuses too =
much on Block IIF=20
and not enough on these other unknowns. They foresee a strong likelihood =
that the IIF=20
satellites will get aloft on time, suitably =E2=80=9Cfollowing on,=E2=80=9D=
as they have been named. The=20
real scary part will come later, in the 2015-2017 timeframe when GPS IIIA=
doesn=E2=80=99t get into=20
orbit in sufficiently quick numbers.

Further, the GAO report did not account for two mitigation tools that the=
DoD has in=20
reserve: three retired satellites still in space that could be brought ba=
ck into=20
operation, and power-shedding as a means to extend satellite life.

Back to the Mitigation Talk.Coming up are some of the strongest words Par=
kinson employed=20
in the PNT Advisory Board presentation: further congenital defects.

=E2=80=9CWhile the Air Force has undertaken a very rigorous test program,=
=E2=80=9D read the presentation=20
notes, =E2=80=9Cit is still conceivable that we will find further congeni=
tal defects. The IIF=20
satellite lacks the powerful military signal that will be extremely helpf=
ul against=20
potential hostile jammers. In addition, it does not broadcast the new int=
ernational signal=20
L1C. Because of the extensive redesign it seems probable that the satelli=
te would have to=20
be re-competed. Finally, this would be a major near-term budget hit in a =
period when the=20
IIF satellite is still over running its budget.=E2=80=9D

Not Even Half the Picture. GPS program planners have one of the most comp=
lex tasks going.=20
They must consider many other issues in addition to keeping an integer nu=
mber of=20
satellites flying. Dual handling of the space and ground segments while b=
oth undergo=20
modernization so that they remain in phase with each other, further synch=
ronization with=20
military user equipment on its own track of development, operating under =
a leadership and=20
decision-making structure that lacks unity at the top, structuring future=
interoperability=20
with other GNSS neither aloft nor complete in their signal-structure desi=
gn =E2=80=94 and then the=20
various PR issues involved with servicing a worldwide, multinational, mul=
ti-industry,=20
multi-requirement customer base.

Personally, I feel much more comfortable here in my armchair.

And despite all the grim news this month, I remain confident that GPS wil=
l continue to=20
lead the field of GNSS, providing exemplary service round the clock, roun=
d the world.

=3D600165
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I saw this op-ed piece this morning. I am still puzzled. Brad is
just writing off IIF. That strikes me as a really bold move. How
could he possibly be so sure that the IIF will fizzle? The Space
shuttle was designed using 1970's technology but still works (BTW, the
Hubble says thank you). The IIF being 1990's technology doesn't
bother me much. What does Brad know that we don't know? The launch
did move from November to 2010/01/27. What is this telling us? What
if it moves again?

Brad is making an engineering judgment. I wonder why the wing is
coming to a different conclusion? Aerospace is still there isn't it?
(Aside: I don't know). Is Aerospace still providing verification
services to the wing, or did that get ditched in the late 1990's as
well? I hope that the wing is listening to the best engineering advice
available.

--Mike Jr

Sam Wormley wrote:

Could you translate, please, preferably with etymology, for those who only
speak UK English?

TIA, Mike.
--
If reply address is invalid, remove spurious "@" and substitute "plus"
where needed.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catbird_seat

ly
ly

The US GPS is still sitting there. Everything must go immediately and
absurdly wrong for GPS to 'fall out' of' the seat.

Perhaps:

a) Wholesale failure of beyond design life space vehicles
b) A huge solar event that swamps the radiation hardening 'burning
out' electronics of multiple satellites
c) Launch failure of the remaining Delta II carrying M8
d) Grounding of Delta/Atlas expendable launch boosters
e) Abandonment of IIF as a failed acquisition that's beyond
redemption
f) Major failures with ground segment infrastructures
g) Russia somehow provides full constellation class GLONASS service
as the GPS infrastructure crumbles
h) Your debacle here ...

I'm not sure how LORAN C fits into the 'catbird' equation. It's been
on the chopping block for some time and it will go away. As practical
matters, even the enhanced version:

a) Doesn't provide 24/7 worldwide service
b) Isn't sufficiently accurate for precision munitions
c) Provides questionable accuracy for management of 'intelligent'
waterways through AIS (Automatic Identification System)

The argument for LORAN as a 'backup' to GPS : 'It's better than
having no radionavigation available' and I have seen references to GPS
being 'out', perhaps during a space weather event. My argument
against it, 'It services legacy users and the user base isn't
expanding'. It follows that nobody is developing user LORAN
equipment; where is a LORAN receiver that's comparable to my Garmin
handheld?

--- CHAS