Assessing the Spoofing Threat

Assessing the Spoofing Threat
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Jan 1, 2009
By: Todd E. Humphreys, Mark L. Psiaki, Paul M. Kintner, Jr.
GPS World

Seven years after the Volpe Report warned that "[a]s GPS further penetrates into
the civil
infrastructure, it becomes a tempting target that could be exploited by
individuals,
groups, or countries hostile to the U.S.," civil GPS receivers remain as
vulnerable as
ever to this threat. Among other types of interference, the Volpe report
considers civil
GPS spoofing, a pernicious type of intentional interference whereby a GPS
receiver is
fooled into tracking counterfeit GPS signals. More sinister than intentional
jamming,
spoofing deceives the targeted receiver, which cannot detect a spoofing attack
and so
cannot warn users that its navigation solution is untrustworthy. The Volpe
report noted
the absence of any off-the-shelf defense against civilian spoofing and lamented
that
"[t]here also is no open information on . . . the expected capabilities of
spoofing
systems made from commercial components." It recommended studies to characterize
the
spoofing threat: "Information on the capabilities, limitations, and operational
procedures
[of spoofers] would help identify vulnerable areas and detection strategies."

We recently canvassed four manufacturers of high-quality GPS receivers. They
revealed that
they were aware of the spoofing vulnerability but had not taken steps to equip
their
receivers with even rudimentary spoofing countermeasures. The manufacturers
expressed
skepticism about the seriousness of the threat and noted that countermeasures,
if
required, had better not be too expensive. Such attitudes propel further
examination of
the threat and practical countermeasures.

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